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THE SCHOLAR
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 1996, Lucas Sekwepere sat before South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, and recounted the horrible crimes commit-
ted against him by state agents under the policy of apartheid.' Mr.
Sekwepere testified that a decade earlier he was blinded after being shot
in the face by a white policeman, and that he was later tortured, nearly
suffocated, and then threatened with death by live burial.' Mr.
Sekwepere further stated that the police's primary purpose for commit-
ting these crimes was to "incite unrest between two black groups" and to
extract information.' After testifying before the Truth Commission, Mr.
Sekwepere initially declared that being able to tell his story was as if the
light had finally pierced through the darkness.4 Mr. Sekwepere's story is
just one example of the extreme brutality and lawlessness that occurred
during apartheid, and the praise he bestows upon the Truth Commission
has been expressed throughout South Africa.5
When Nelson Mandela, the head of the African National Congress, was
elected President on April 27, 1994,6 in South Africa's first nonracial
democratic elections, he and his new government faced many challenges.7
The most pressing problem confronting the new government was how to
reconcile a country that had been torn apart for decades by apartheid.8
In the attempt to promote national unity and reconciliation, as well as
secure a peaceful transition to democracy, the interim Constitution of
1993 abolished apartheid and provided the possibility of amnesty for
1. See Roger Thurow, A Blind Man Grows Restless, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2000, at Al,
available at 2000 WL-WSJ 3036688; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining apartheid as "racial segregation, specifically a policy of discrimination and segre-
gation against blacks in South Africa").
2. Thurow, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See NELSON MANDELA'S STATEMENT AFTER VOTING IN SOUTH AFRICA'S FIRST
DEMOCRATIC ELECTION, at http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1994/sp940427.
html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (stating that votes were cast on April 27, 1994, and Nelson
Mandela was elected President of South Africa).
7. See Only the Truth Can Put the Past to Rest, TIME FOR KIDS, Mar. 6, 1998, at 4,
available at http://www.timeforkids.com/TFK/magazines/story/0,6277,89921.00html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Only the Truth]; BRUCE FETTER, South Africa, in 18 THE
WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 608, 621 (Scott Fetzer Co., 2000).
8. See FEITER, supra note 7; ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, Human Rights for Every-
one, in SOUTH AFRICA: CAN A COUN-RY OVERCOME ITS HIS-TORY? (1998), at http://www.
learner.org/exhibits/southafrica (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Mi-
nority Issues) (noting that the new constitution was intended to "heal the divisions between
South Afrifca's various communities").
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those who committed political crimes under the old regime.9 In order to
give full effect to the constitutional mandate, Parliament established the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).' ° One of the TRC's main
goals was to obtain a complete accounting of past transgressions in the
hopes that they would never be forgotten, and thus never repeated.11
Four years after Mr. Sekwepere testified before the Truth Commission,
rather than feeling closure, forgiveness or reconciliation, Mr. Sekwepere
continued to see the inequities brought about by apartheid and still felt
the anger associated with apartheid's cruelties.12 The Truth Commission
was established to promote and provide national peace and reconcilia-
tion, yet the process was complex and the results have been controver-
sial.13 Along with many South Africans, Mr. Sekwepere wonders if peace
or reconciliation can ever be attained without justice.14
This comment will first discuss the history of South Africa, how
apartheid developed from a customary practice to a government-sanc-
tioned policy, and how the black majority staged its resistance. Section
two will briefly define truth commissions, and then focus on the creation
and purpose of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in-
cluding a summary of the TRC's praise and criticism. Section three will
contrast the TRC's course of action - truth in exchange for criminal pros-
ecution - with the traditional notions of justice. This comment will then
argue that the Truth Commission did not produce its stated goals of na-
tional unity and reconciliation. Section five will next contend that retrib-
utive justice better promotes the rule of law. In conclusion, this comment
will propose several steps South Africa and the international community
should take in order to truly achieve reconciliation while promoting the
rule of law.
9. Epilogue, Constitution Act 200 of 1993, at http://www.gov.za/constitution/1993/1993
cons.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003).
10. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, http://www.gov.
za/gazette/acts/1995/a34-95.htm. The preamble of the Act discusses the need to meet the
objectives of the 1993 Constitution of South Africa. Id. at prmbl. Chapter Two of the Act
provides for the actual creation of a "juristic person" to be known as the Truth and Recon-
ciliation Commission. Id. at §2(1).
11. Id. (providing that the Act seeks to establish a complete picture of past violations
of human rights and to establish preventive measures). The preamble to the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act provides that "it is deemed necessary to establish
the truth in relation to past events as well as the motives for and the circumstances in
which gross violations and human rights have occurred and to make the findings known in
order to prevent a repetition of such acts in the future."
12. See Thurow, supra note 1.
13. See id.
14. See id.
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II. EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION AND CREATION OF APARTHIED
A. Landscape and History of South Africa
South Africa is the southern-most country in Africa, 15 sharing its
northern border with Nambia, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and
Swaziland. 6 On the east and south, it is bordered by the Indian Ocean,
and to the west by the Atlantic Ocean.17 South Africa was originally in-
habited by groups of hunters and gatherers and nomadic tribes that
herded cattle. 8 In 1652, the Dutch East India Company became the first
European company to arrive in South Africa. 9 Between 1680 and 1707,
native South Africans witnessed the arrival of Dutch, German and French
immigrants who came to be known as Boers (Dutch for "farmers") or
Afrikaners.20 During the 17th century, these immigrants imported slaves
from Asia and other parts of Africa to South Africa. 1 In the early 19th
century, the British began occupying South African territory;22 with occu-
pation came the demands that English law be imposed.23 These measures
were intensely disliked by the early European settlers known as the
Afrikaners, and many moved northward into the Transvaal territories. 24
15. FETTER, supra note 7, at 610.
16. Id.
17. See id.
18. Id. at 618.
19. See id.; see also Only the Truth, supra note 7; ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, supra
note 8 (asserting that the Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch traders, were one of the main
European groups that sought power in South Africa); Guarva Misra, The Boers, at http://
www.pvhs.chico.kl2.ca.us/-bsilva/projects/scramble/boers.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003)
(on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
20. See FETTER, supra note 7, at 618-19 (noting that "Boer people were Dutch farm-
ers who settled in the southern part of Africa in the 17th century; that they intermingled
with other European settlers and established the Afrikaner or Boer (Dutch for farmer)
community; and that although the Boer population was actually a mix of various Europe-
ans, the predominant culture was Dutch Protestant"); ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS,
Europeans in South Africa, in SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 8.
21. See FETTER, supra note 7, at 618 (stating that the language of European settlers
incorporated certain traits from those spoken by Southeast Asian slaves and African
servants).
22. See id.; ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, supra note 20 (discussing the British colonial
presence in South Africa).
23. ANTHONY LEMON ET AL., South Africa, in MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCY-
CLOPEDIA, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761557321&
pn=6 (noting that the imposition of English law within South Africa occurred in 1820).
24. Id.; see FETTER, supra note 7, at 618; see also ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, supra
note 20 (discussing the history of the Afrikaner people including the trek north from Cape
Town).
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By the late 1850s, the Transvaal territories had combined to form the
South African Republic. 25 The policies of separation between Blacks and
Whites, including forced removal of Blacks from their communities, de-
tention without trial, and lengthy imprisonments, became even more pro-
nounced. 6 For example, Blacks and Whites were segregated in their
living environments, their employment, and their education; political par-
ticipation by the black majority was forbidden or viciously prevented by
the ruling White class; and ownership of real property was becoming a
possibility for Whites only. 27 Discriminatory practices were "woven
throughout the fabric of the South African society," and reinforced by
violent action.2 " By the middle of the 19th century, the British had occu-
pied all the major urban centers, and in 1877 the Transvaal territories
were annexed by Britain and became colonies of the British crown. 9
Thereafter, the British Parliament passed the South Africa Act of 1910,30
which solidified the oppressive racial inequities towards Blacks.31 Elec-
tions were held that year and the country's first parliament was formed.3 2
The new parliament's first order of business was passing the Natives Land
Act of 1913, which prohibited most Blacks from buying or owning land.3 3
In 1914, the National Party (NP) was founded, and by the 1920s, the
white minority dominated South African politics.3 4 When the NP came
to power in 1948, segregation and inequality between Blacks and Whites
25. See FErrER, supra note 7, at 619 (stating the Transvaal was known as the South
African Republic).
26. See id. J. David Ellwanger & Robert F. Drinan, American Bar Association Report
to the House of Delegates Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities Standing Com-
mittee on World Order Under Law, 28 How. L. J. 653, 666-68 (1985) (discussing the history
of relocation and removal).
27. See FETTER, supra note 7, at 609.
28. Ellwanger, supra note 26, at 662.
29. See FETTER, supra note 7, at 619; ANNENBERO/CPB EXHIBITS, supra note 20 (stat-
ing that "the British replaced the Dutch as the dominant European power [in South Af-
rica] at the beginning of the 19th century"); ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, Diamonds and
Gold, in SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 8 (noting that the British were determined to exercise
control over the gold and diamond mines in the Transvaal region).
30. See Only the Truth, supra note 7; FErrER, supra note 7, at 619.
31. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23 (noting a provision in the South Africa Act of
1910, wherein change in the policies towards Blacks would require a majority vote of two-
thirds by parliament); ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, supra note 29 (stating that after 1910,
power was held by white political parties).
32. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23.
33. See id.
34. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23; FETTER, supra note 7, at 619 (joining forces of
the National Party and the Labour Party to gain control of the government in 1924).
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transformed from customary practice into written law.35 At the center of
the NP's agenda was the institution of apartheid.36 The tenets of
apartheid emphasized the promotion of white supremacy, white exploita-
tion, and white political domination.37 These tenets were harshly rein-
forced by segregation in education and housing, discrimination in
employment, and prohibitions on marriage between Whites and Blacks.38
To further entrench the policy of apartheid, the Supreme Court was filled
with six pro-apartheid judges;39 and by 1958, apartheid sympathizers
made up the majority of the Senate and House of Assembly.4° Thus,
"South Africa [was] unique [in the sense that it was] the only country in
the world with racial discrimination enshrined into its Constitution [and]
[i]ts entire governmental, political, economic, social, and legal structure
[was] predicated on distinctions based on race or color."41
B. The Institution of and Resistance to Apartheid
Despite the NP's efforts to ingrain the apartheid apparatus into every
aspect of society, by 1923 the African National Congress (ANC) had es-
tablished itself as an anti-apartheid organization.42 For almost fifty years
35. See Only the Truth, supra note 7 (noting the rule of South Africa from 1948-1994
was under a system that kept Black and White citizens separate); FErTTER, supra note 7, at
620.
36. See Only the Truth, supra note 7 (noting that South Africa was ruled under
apartheid); see also FETTER, supra note 7, at 609, 620 (defining apartheid as an Afrikaans
word meaning separateness); ANNENBERc/CPB EXHIBITS, Apartheid: The Beginning, in
SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 8.
37. See Rasheed Araen, What is Post-Apartheid South Africa and its Place in the
World?, at http://sunsite.wits.ac.za/biennale/essays/araeen.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003)
(explaining that the separation of people based upon their race under apartheid came from
"an ideology of supremacy practiced by a dominant race"); Only the Truth, supra note 7
(stating that during apartheid none of the 32 million Black citizens had the right to vote or
participate in the government).
38. See Only the Truth, supra note 7 (separating Black and White citizens in terms of
schools, neighborhoods, and other basic civil rights); FE-1-MR, supra note 7, at 609 (segre-
gating racial groups in housing, education, and employment); ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS,
supra note 36.
39. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23 (noting that in 1955 the parliament approved
appointment of six Supreme Court justices who were sympathetic to apartheid in order to
"assure the support for the program").
40. See id. (stating that after the 1958 election, the National Party increased its mem-
bership and thus its control in the House of Assembly); see also ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIB-
ITS, Resistance, in SOUTH AFRICA, supra note 8 (noting that by the early 1960s, the
apartheid government was consolidating its power and smashing all opposition).
41. Ellwanger, supra note 26, at 656 (condemning South Africa's complete contempt
for the Rule of Law and abuse of basic human rights).
42. See FE-ITER, supra note 7, at 619.
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the ANC pursued a course of peaceful protest within South Africa.43
Other organizations, such as the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), did not
share the ANC's approach, but instead pursued a more militant strat-
egy.44 The strength and size of the anti-apartheid organizations fright-
ened the white power structure, and by April of 1960, both the ANC and
the PAC were outlawed.4" In the following years, the ANC's commit-
ment to non-violent civil disobedience diminished, and both the ANC
and PAC turned to armed resistance.4 6 In response to the increased up-
risings, the apartheid government passed legislation granting the police
broad powers, such as authorization to arrest without a warrant.47 With
this new tool, most of the nationalist leadership, including Nelson
Mandela, was imprisoned. 48
At the same time, South Africa's apartheid policies were receiving dis-
approval from the international community.49 Initially, the United Na-
tions General Assembly called upon South Africa to adhere to its
obligations under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to recog-
nize "the inherent dignity, equality and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family," by putting an end to racial discrimination."0 The
South African leadership chose to disregard these requests even though
they knew the acts associated with apartheid, such as torture, rape, and
murder, violated domestic and international law.51 In response, the
United Nations imposed sanctions upon South Africa, and in 1974 they
suspended the country from the General Assembly.52 "By the 1980s,
General Assembly resolutions referred to apartheid as a crime against
humanity," which could then be prosecuted under the United Nations
43. See FET'ER, supra note 7, at 619-20 (linking ANC's use of civil disobedience to
Mohandas K. Gandhi's struggle to increase the rights of Indians in South Africa).
44. See id. at 620 (explaining that PAC opposed ANC cooperation with white groups
and that PAC sought an all-black government).
45. See FETTER, supra note 7, at 620 (citing the incident on March 12, 1960, when PAC
members gathered at police stations without their identification papers; the protest oc-
curred without much incident, except in Sharpeville where police fired at and killed 69
black protesters).
46. See ANNENBERG/CPB EXHIBITS, supra note 40; LEMON ET AL., supra note 23.
47. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23.
48. See id.; FETTER, supra note 7 (citing that Nelson Mandela was arrested for sabo-
tage and conspiracy, and was sentenced to life in prison).
49. See FETTER, supra note 7, at 620 (noting that the South African government re-
ceived much criticism from Commonwealth of Nations, prompting South Africa to leave
the Commonwealth).
50. Ellwanger, supra note 26, at 661.
51. See Only the Truth, supra note 7; Ellwanger, supra note 26, at 661.
52. LEMON ET AL., supra note 23; see FETTER, supra note 7, at 620-21 (noting that
sanctions were imposed on South Africa as an expression of opposition to apartheid).
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Charter and international law.53 The United Nations' course of action
signaled the "growing international opposition to apartheid., 54 But in-
stead of instituting criminal prosecutions, the U.N. stopped short at sus-
pension and resolutions, neither of which measures brought apartheid to
an end.
By June of 1976, the South African black youth were deeply involved
in the struggle towards liberation, and the cycle of violence worsened.
Due to the increased violence during the 1980s and the implementation
of stringent economic controls, South Africa's economic growth came to
a standstill. 56 The country's economic decline was also due in part to the
United States Congress' enactment of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986."7 The Act imposed economic sanctions against
South Africa, prohibited new investment and loans, and barred importing
and exporting agricultural products and raw materials.58 Because South
Africa was regarded as unstable for investment, in 1987 Congress passed
another measure requiring "complete divestment by American citizens
and companies of their holdings in South Africa."5 9 This legislative direc-
tive resulted in close to three hundred United States companies pulling
their investments and businesses out of the country.6°
53. LEMON ET AL., supra note 23; see Michael P. Scharf, Impunity and Human Rights
in International Law and Practice, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 173, 174 (1996) (book review) (ob-
serving that customary international law allows "permissive jurisdiction over perpetrators
of crimes against humanity" and permits their prosecution).
54. LEMON ET AL., supra note 23.
55. See id. (discussing riots by Black high school students in protest of a government
rule that required certain subjects to be taught in the Afrikaans language); FETrER, supra
note 7, at 620.
56. See Jennifer Frankel, Note, The Legal and Regulatory Climate for Investment in
Post-Apartheid South Africa: An Historical Overview, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
183, 184-85 (1998). "South Africa also controlled its people through its economic policies,
such as the dual currency system and foreign exchange controls. The government imple-
mented strict foreign exchange controls to regulate the flow of funds in and out of the
country. The controls were necessary because of the political instability." Id. at 184.
57. See Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1986),
repealed by South African Democratic Support Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-149 § 4, 107
Stat. 1503 (1993); Frankel, supra note 56, at 189.
58. 22 U.S.C. § 5002; Frankel, supra note 56, at 189.
59. Frankel, supra note 56, at 190. See generally Henry J. Richardson III, Current
Development: Divestment of the Stock Portfolio of the Society, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 744, 745
(1987) (discussing the arguments for and against divestment in South Africa).
60. Frankel, supra note 56, at 190.
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C. Apartheid Comes to an End
In 1989, F.W. de Klerk was elected President of South Africa.61 He
recognized that in order for the country to survive, change was neces-
sary.6 z Having observed the growing chaos, de Klerk aligned himself
with both sides of his party - the conservatives and the ultra-conserva-
tives.6 3 The direction de Klerk was to take was unclear until he was
elected president. "From that point on, his approach could not have been
more different from that of his predecessor, P.W. Botha."6 4
Due to international pressure, increased violence, internal turmoil, and
de Klerk's own opposition to his party's racist legislation, in 1990 he be-
gan to implement some sweeping changes.65 De Klerk allowed open pro-
test against apartheid, ordered the release of numerous Black political
prisoners, and lifted bans on the ANC and the PAC.6 6 The combination
of global sanctions and political instability weakened the apartheid appa-
ratus and led to the disintegration of one of its necessary components -
white cohesiveness.6 7 Thus, de Klerk's decision to release Nelson
Mandela from prison and pursue negotiations with the black majority re-
garding the transition to a free South Africa was a strategic attempt to
keep the white machinery in power.68 However, in 1994, the first nonra-
cial democratic election was held, wherein twenty million votes were
cast," and South Africa witnessed a truly historical event as Nelson
Mandela ascended to the presidency."y
61. LEMON ET AL., supra note 23; FErER, supra note 7.
62. BBC News, FW de Klerk: Overseer of Transition (Oct. 30, 1998), at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special-report1998/10/98/truth-and-reconciliation/202388.stm (last visited
Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Minority Issues).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.; LEMON ET AL., supra note 23 (noting that de Klerk authorized and ordered
sweeping changes).
66. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23; BBC News, supra note 62.
67. Lorna McGregor, Individual Accountability in South Africa: Cultural Optimum or
Political Facade, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 32, 33 (2001) (arguing that the apartheid regime re-
sulted from the "internal and international pressure that was systematically corroding
apartheid."); G. Marcus Cole, Towards a Post-Apartheid Future: Political & Economical
Relations in Southern Africa, 13 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 711, 713 (1993) (reviewing Robert
Schrire, White Politics and Strategies in the 1990's (1992)).
68. Id. at 714; see Emily H. McCarthy, Note, South Africa's Amnesty Process: A Via-
ble Route Toward Truth and Reconciliation, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 183, 184 (1997) (stating
that de Klerk's government entered into negotiations with the ANC to determine the re-
lease of political prisoners); FETTER, supra note 7, at 620 (discussing de Klerk's release of
Mandela from prison and the negotiations between de Klerk and the ANC).
69. LEMON ET AL., supra note 23.
70. See Only the Truth, supra note 7; FETrER, supra note 7.
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III. A NEW SOUTH AFRICA
A. Political Negotiations & The Government of National Unity
After the dismantling of apartheid, the white minority still controlled
the economy and the military,7 and as such had the might and money to
topple the fragile democracy if harsh concessions were exacted upon
them for the vicious cruelties committed during their reign.7" Mandela's
new government recognized this very real possibility. In order to avoid
renewed expressions of civil unrest, armed resistance and apartheid-style
violence, amnesty was politically negotiated and then constitutionally
proscribed for murderers, torturers, rapists, and thieves.73 Thus, a deli-
cate compromise between a cover-up and an exhaustive attempt to inves-
tigate every allegation of government sanctioned brutality was struck.74
As President of a newly developing democratic state, Mandela's Gov-
ernment of National Unity (GNU) faced the challenges of reconciling a
nation victimized by apartheid,75 responding to the allegations of gross
human rights violations committed during apartheid, and reassuring the
white minority that the black majority would not seek vengeance for the
atrocities of apartheid.76 In efforts to address these problems, the interim
71. Peter Storey, A Different Kind of Justice: Truth and Reconciliation in South Af-
rica, NEW WORLD OUTLOOK, July-Aug. 1999, available at http://gbgm-umc.org/nwo/99ja/
different2.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002) (stating that "apartheid may have been defeated,
but its minions still dominated the police, the army, and the civil service"); McCarthy,
supra note 68 (recognizing that the economic and military powers remained with the Na-
tional Party).
72. See McCarthy, supra note 68.
73. See id. at 183 n.1, 184-85 (listing statistical information regarding incidents of polit-
ically motivated violence and the desire of anti-apartheid groups to end that violence);
Thurow, supra note 1 (providing detailed examples of politically motivated violence).
74. Theodore J. Piccone, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon
with Former Regimes, Vol. 1: General Considerations; Vol. 2: Country Studies; Vol. 3:
Laws, Rulings, and Reports, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 540, 541 (1996) (book review); Cyrille
Hugon, In South Africa 20 Years After Steven Biko's Death, the Truth Commission Grap-
ples with the Meaning of Justice, SLANT, Spring 1997, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/sipa/
PUBS/SLANT/SPRING97/hugon.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2003) (quoting Desmond Tutu
as admitting that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was "the only alternative to
Nuremberg on the one hand, and amnesia on the other").
75. Frankel, supra note 56, at 195-96 (discussing the emergence of the GNU during a
time of economic and political uncertainty caused by the lingering effects of apartheid).
76. See Only the Truth, supra note 7. "As white rule came to an end, many Whites
feared that Blacks would seek revenge for the cruelties of apartheid. So the white govern-
ment and Mandela's new government made a deal. People who had committed crimes for
or against apartheid could receive amnesty... if they did one thing: tell the truth about their
crimes." Id.
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Constitution, assented to on January 25, 1994, abolished apartheid.77
Furthermore, it provided under the provision entitled "National Unity
and Reconciliation" that:
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty
shall be granted in respects of acts, omissions and offenses associated
with political objectives and committed in the course of the conflicts
of the past. To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall
adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date
after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for
the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any,
through which such amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the
law has been passed.78
This constitutional directive was implemented with the passage of the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995; 79 it was
then reinforced within the provisions of the permanent Constitution of
1996.80 The Act's main purpose was to establish a Truth and Reconcilia-
tion Commission.8'
B. Truth Commissions
Truth commissions are not novel, and have been utilized by countries
such as Argentina and Chile.8" A truth commission's main purpose is to
investigate and address human rights abuses that occurred under tyranni-
cal regimes.83 The goal of the truth commission is to promote democratic
justice by way of a non-adversarial, truth-telling process. 84 Truth commis-
sions concentrate on what has been termed the "truth phase," wherein
revelation of the truth about former regimes is the primary purpose.
8 5
The success of truth commissions in achieving their goal for social recon-
77. § 8 of Constitution Act 200 of 1993, http://www.gov.za/constitution/1993/1993cons.
htm#SECTION8 (providing the legislative requirements of equality regardless of race,
thus effectively ending apartheid).
78. Id. § 251.
79. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, at http://www.
gov.za/gazette/acts/1995/a34-95.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
80. Schedule 6, § 22 of Constitution Act 108 of 1996, http://www.gov.za/constitution/
1996/96conssec.6htm#22 (last visited Apr. 7, 2003).
81. Pmbl. of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.
82. Karen Cavanaugh, Note, Emerging South Africa: Human Rights Responses in the
Post-Apartheid Era, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. 291, 321-24 (1997).
83. See id.; Peter A. Schey, et. al., Addressing Human Rights Abuses: Truth Commis-
sions and the Value of Amnesty, 19 WHITrIER L. REV. 325, 332-33 (1997).
84. See Kirsty Sangster, Comment, Truth Commissions: The Usefulness of Truth-tell-
ing, 5 AUSTRALIAN J. OF HUM. RTS., at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/ahric/ajhr/V5N1/
ajhr5l5.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2002).
85. See id.
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ciliation is determined in part by their structure, membership, power to
compel, and support from all components of the social spectrum.86 The
truths that are revealed to the commissions are then used to rewrite the
former regime's version of history, 7 and thereafter provide a better un-
derstanding of the brutality and devastation, a more accurate account of
the victims who suffered as a result, and a clearer picture of those who
were responsible.88
C. South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Similarly, the ANC sponsored truth commissions in South Africa in
1992 and again in 1993.89 Yet, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
that emerged in 1995 as the creation of political negotiations and compro-
mise between the defeated NP pro-apartheid party and Mandela's GNU
seemed ideally appropriate for the tasks confronting the new South Af-
rica.9° The primary objective of South Africa's TRC was:
[t]o provide for the investigation and the establishment of as com-
plete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross
violations of human rights... [and to grant] amnesty to persons who
make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to the acts asso-
ciated with a political objective committed in the course of the con-
flicts of the past.91
The TRC's mandate called for understanding, reparation, and
ubuntu,92 rather than vengeance and retaliation. 93 The President ap-
pointed eighteen commissioners to the TRC; those appointed had to be
86. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and
Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dig-
nity, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 316, 331-32 (1999).
87. See Kirsty Sangster, supra note 84.
88. See Schey et al., supra note 83, at 326.
89. See Marianne Geula, Note, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission
as an Alternate Means of Addressing Transitional Government Conflicts in a Divided Soci-
ety, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 57, 63 (2000) (explaining how South Africa demonstrated it had the
experience in investigative processes before the creation of the TRC by sponsoring prior
truth commissions).
90. See McCarthy, supra note 68, at 183 n.1, 184-85 (1997); Thurow, supra note 1.
91. Pmbl. of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, http://
www.gov.za/gazette/acts/1995/txt/a34-95txt (last visited on Apr. 7, 2003).
92. Justice Pius Langa, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 34 INT'L
LAW. 347, 352 (2000) (defining ubuntu as being "an African concept that simply means 'a
humanness' - being human as distinct from being an animal"); McGregor, supra note 67, at
38.
93. Pmbl. of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act; see A Reconcilia-
tion Without Vengeance, LONDON INDEP., Aug. 1, 1998, at 3, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Indpnt File.
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capable of impartiality and have proven integrity.94 To further facilitate
the investigation and reparation process, the TRC was equipped with a
Committee on Human Rights Violations, a Committee on Reparations
and Rehabilitation, and a Committee on Amnesty.95 Subsequently, the
TRC began conducting investigations and hearings whereby truth telling
was promoted in order to reconstruct the soul of South Africa and recon-
cile the wounds of the past.96
1. The TRC's Committee on Human Rights & Committee on
Reparation and Rehabilitation
The Committee on Human Rights was directed to "take into account
the gross violations of human rights... [and] record allegations and com-
plaints of gross violations of human rights." 97 The committee was armed
with the authority to conduct inquiries, take evidence, and make recom-
mendations to the Commission.98 If after finding that gross violations of
human rights had been committed, the Committee on Human Rights re-
ferred the matter to the Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation.99
The Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation was designed so
that "[a]ny person who is of the opinion that he or she has suffered harm
as a result of a gross violation of human rights may apply to the Commit-
tee for reparations."1 ' The Reparations Committee possessed the power
of recommending the basis and conditions upon which reparations would
be granted, as well as when reparations would be reduced or
discontinued."'
The TRC's Human Rights and Reparation and Rehabilitation Commit-
tees added a modicum of humanity to the desperate and complex situa-
tion facing the new South Africa, and allowed a semblance of justice to
be done. However, neither committee received as much attention or den-
igrated the TRC's objectives as the Amnesty Committee.
94. Storey, supra note 71.
95. Pmbl., § 5(c) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (providing
the Commission with the power to "establish sub-committees to exercise, carry out or per-
form any of the powers, duties and functions assigned to them by the Commission").
96. See Geula, supra note 89, at 81; see Charles Villa-Vicencio, Why Perpetrators
Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal Court and Truth
Commissions Meet, 49 EMORY L.J. 205, 212 (2000).
97. § 14(1)(a) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.
98. Id. § 14(1)(a)-(b).
99. Id. § 15(1).
100. Id. § 26(1).
101. Id. § 27(1)-(3).
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2. The TRC's Amnesty Committee
The opportunity to come forward and possibly receive amnesty was
available to all South Africans - black and white supporters and oppo-
nents of apartheid.'1 2 The TRC's Amnesty Committee was charged with
the task of deciding whether the "act, omission, or offense to which the
application relates is an act associated with a political objective commit-
ted in the course of the conflicts of the past."'0 3 After making the initial
determination that the act was associated with a political objective, the
applicant was required to make a full disclosure of all the relevant facts
concerning the act.1"4 If all the requirements under the Promotion of
National Unity and Reconciliation Act were satisfactorily met, then am-
nesty would be granted. 10 5
Receiving a grant of amnesty from the TRC had significant effects.
First, a grant of amnesty shielded the applicant from further criminal
prosecution. 0 6 For example, if the applicant faced criminal prosecution
at the time his application was submitted to the TRC, the criminal prose-
cution was normally postponed until the TRC concluded its investigation
and reached a decision. If amnesty was granted, the prosecution was
abandoned entirely.0 7 Second, the TRC's grant of amnesty had the ef-
fect of eliminating a criminal judgment rendered by a court of law."0 8 For
instance, if the applicant had been previously convicted and sentenced for
a crime, upon a grant of amnesty, the applicant was released from impris-
onment and the conviction was expunged from the offender's record.'0 9
102. See McCarthy, supra note 68, at 190 (noting that amnesty was available for lead-
ers of both the apartheid and anti-apartheid movements).
103. § 20(I)(b) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act; South Africa
Looks Back, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 13, available at LEXIS, News Library, Econ
File.
104. § 20(1)(c) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act; Elizabeth T.
Stewart, The Proportionality Principle in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 8 TEMP. POL. & CiV.
RTS. L. REV. 113, 124 (1998); see Only the Truth, supra note 7 (noting that "people who
had committed crimes for or against apartheid could receive amnesty - or protection from
punishment - if they did one thing: tell the truth about their crimes").
105. § 20(1)(c) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act.
106. Id. § 20(7)(a) (lifting criminal liability for private acts covered by a grant of am-
nesty); McCarthy, supra note 68, at 185 (discussing the marginal prerequisites for amnesty
exempting applicants from criminal liability).
107. § 20(8) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (voiding pending
trials and sentences upon publication of a grant of amnesty); McCarthy, supra note 68, at
189 (acknowledging that a grant of amnesty stopped prosecutions and erased convictions).
108. § 20(8) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act (stating that a
grant of amnesty voids convictions and lapses sentences).
109. § 20(10) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act; McCarthy,
supra note 68, at 198 (noting that if amnesty is granted, the conviction is erased from the
record and the amnesty recipient is immediately release from jail).
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The grant of amnesty also shielded an applicant from further civil liabil-
ity.11° So if a civil suit was instituted, the proceeding was postponed
awaiting the TRC's decision, and if amnesty was granted, the civil suit
would be dismissed and the victim would be barred from obtaining any
recovery, pecuniary or otherwise. 1 ' Thus, the TRC's Amnesty Commit-
tee was armed with valuable incentives to motivate both supporters and
opponents of apartheid to come forward and disclose the truth." 2
D. Praise for the TRC
Learning to forgive is much more useful than merely picking up a
stone and throwing it at the object of one's anger, more so when the
provocation is extreme.' 1 3
Supporters maintain that the goals of national unity and reconciliation
were best served by the TRC.'1 4 They assert that the disclosure of the
truth and the opportunity to forgive benefitted "the victim more effec-
tively than judicial proceedings."' 5 It is their argument that the purpose
of the TRC was to understand and to account for the past, and that ad-
mitting the truth was punishment enough.1 16 In addition, proponents of
the TRC allege that initiating criminal prosecutions against apartheid
wrongdoers would have not only been too difficult, too costly, and too
impractical for the fragile democracy, but also too inadequate to do jus-
tice.1 17 These same proponents praise the TRC's decision to prioritize
110. § 20(7)(a) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. The provision
regarding amnesty from civil liability had no effect on judgments entered prior to the proc-
lamation of amnesty. Judgments rendered before amnesty was granted continued to be
binding. Id. § 20(9).
111. McCarthy, supra note 68, at 198.
112. See § 20(7)(a) of Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act; Only the
Truth, supra note 7 (observing that since the Commission's first hearing in April 1996,
more than 7,000 people volunteered to tell the truth about past crimes).
113. McGregor, supra note 67, at 38.
114. See id. at 36-37.
115. Id. at 38.
116. See Elliot Abrams, Truth Without Justice?, POL'v REV., Feb. 1, 2001, available at
2001 WL 16903033 (reviewing TRUTH V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF TRUTH COMMISIONS
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., Princeton University Press, 2000)) (elevating
"reconciliation over retribution, focuses on permitting victims to tell their stories and
regain their dignity rather than on punishing the perpetrators' actions"); McCarthy, supra
note 68, at 188 (stating that the commission's processes "offer a better prospect of promot-
ing the truth about South Africa's past than criminal trials").
117. McGregor, supra note 67, at 36 (quoting Judge Goldstone as stating "[t]here
would be too many accused and adequate punishment too costly in human, political, as
well as financial terms"); Abrams, supra note 116; John F. Murphy, Book Note, Transna-
tional Fugitive Offenders in International Law: Extradition and Other Mechanisms, 93 AM.
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reconciliation over retribution, which in turn allowed the "victims to tell
their stories and regain their dignity." '118 The supporters emphasize that
the TRC was the only feasible way to reconciliation."1 9 And these senti-
ments continue to gain ground when reiterated by Archbishop Desmond
Tutu, the head of the TRC and one of its most influential and widely
known advocates. 120
E. Criticism of the TRC
"[A] scorpion under a stone."' 121
Critics of the TRC argue that victims cannot reconcile with the perpe-
trators of such brutal atrocities in the absence of criminal prosecution and
punishment. 22 Opponents maintain that the offer of amnesty in ex-
change for the truth did not awaken the conscience of the guilty, compel
their truthful disclosure, and thus result in forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion.' 23 Rather, opponents of the TRC submit that the systematic tor-
ture, maiming, and killing associated with apartheid went completely
unpunished.2 4 It is their position that criminal prosecutions were ade-
quate to do justice, and that the TRC's truth process did not foster na-
tional unity or reconstruction, but instead "hardened racial relations
between blacks and whites."'' 25
IV. THE TRC's TRUTH VS. THE TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF JUSTICE
A. The TRC and Restorative Justice
The TRC received over 7,000 applications for amnesty, and after five
years of conducting hearings and receiving testimony from over 21,000
J. INT'L L. 752, 754 (1999); Stewart, supra note 104, at 118-19 (noting that both the new and
old governments had "much more to gain from the amnesty process than from criminal
prosecution").
118. Abrams, supra note 116.
119. See id.
120. Profile: South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Shut Down
(NPR broadcast, May 30, 2001), available at 2001 WL 9434963 (interviewing Archbishop
Desmond Tutu who asserted that "in the long run things would have been much worse
without the TRC").
121. South Africa: Why the M&G Matters, AFR. NEWS, Sept. 7, 2001, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Afrnws File.
122. See Thurow, surpa note 1; see also Editorial, More Work Left, South Africa's
Truth Commission Has Only Begun Healing Process, POST-STANDARD, June 1, 2001, at
A12, available at 2001 WL 5546674.
123. See Thurow, supra note 1; Abrams, supra note 116.
124. See Storey, supra note 71.
125. Thurow, supra note 1.
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victims, 126 the TRC was officially dissolved on May 23, 2001.127 The
TRC's efforts at confronting the outrageous and gruesome atrocities
committed during apartheid demonstrate that both white and black South
Africans found the apartheid-era abuses completely unacceptable and
wholly undeniable.128
Truth was seen as a prerequisite to reconciliation,1 29 and in trying to
foster national unity, the TRC took advantage of the concept of restora-
tive justice.1 3' Restorative justice aims to re-unite the perpetrator and
the victim, and restore the status quo within society.' 3' Because the main
goal of a truth commission is to uncover and document the truth of the
past, reconcile and unify the country, and bring a sense of closure to all
the victims, 132 the birth of the TRC was the means to "confront the past
with restorative justice but without the bloodbath that a policy of retribu-
tion might bring about. ' 3 3 The TRC reasoned that "knowledge of the
truth would itself promote social healing and reconciliation."' 34 By
choosing a restorative justice model underscored with a full disclosure of
the truth, the TRC aligned itself with South Africa's cultural value of oral
tradition. 135 Thus, the TRC squarely set forth truth as the paramount
goal and the most practical solution for achieving reconciliation and se-
curing a peaceful and successful transition to democracy for all South
Africans.
1 36
126. See More Work Left, supra note 122.
127. Proc R32/2001 (reconvening the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on June
2001 and dissolving it on December 31, 2001).
128. See Jennifer Widner, Courts and Democracy in Post-conflict Transitions: A Social
Scientist's Perspective on the African Case, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 64, 67 (2001) (illustrating that
the South African community found the abuses wholly unacceptable).
129. Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Institutions for Restorative Justice: The
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 355, 368 (1999).
130. Villa-Vicencio, supra note 96, at 214.
131. Id. at 214-15.
132. See Jeanne M. Woods, Reconciling Reconciliation, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR-
EIGN AFF. 81, 82-84 (1998) (introducing the basic elements of Truth Commission
mechanisms).
133. JUSTICE CTR., UNIV. OF ALASKA ANCHORAGE, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN
SOUTH AFRICA (2001), at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/just/just490/truth/truth.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2002).
134. Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
379, 391 (1999).
135. See Geula, supra note 89, at 82-83 (concluding that the TRC's promotion of pub-
lic dialogue is consistent with the notion of citizenship); Villa-Vicencio, supra note 19, at
212 (contrasting truth commissions with the criminal trials to illustrate that criminal trials
are ill-equipped to deal with the larger needs of society).
136. See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 19, at 212-13 (arguing that protecting vital national
interests and national stability requires a balancing of human rights in favor of societal
peace as opposed to individual retribution).
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B. Traditional Notions of Justice
"Indeed, there can be no peace in South Africa, or anywhere, with-
out justice.' 137
Under the traditional notions of justice, crimes such as torture, rape,
murder, and theft, are to be prosecuted in a court of law, and the offend-
ers are to receive sentences of punishment for the crimes committed. 38
In order for any country to fairly promote and fiercely protect the basic
principles of "equal treatment of all people before the law," that country
must create and maintain a strong legal system based upon the rule of
law.139
The rule of law seeks to keep nations free from tyranny, to prevent
gross violations of human rights, and to give a voice to the voiceless.140 It
is a crucial precondition for political, economic, and social develop-
ment; 14' and absent the rule of law, a nation-state does not have the nec-
essary legal framework for a civil society to prosper. 142
Criminal prosecutions resulting in proportional punishments are well-
established components of the rule of law because they provide legiti-
macy and adherence to the over-arching purpose of establishing and
maintaining civilized, flourishing societies. 143 "The goal of building a de-
mocracy under the rule of law counts heavily in favor of justice, fairly
administered, for past violations. ,144
137. More Work Left, supra note 122.
138. See Geula, supra note 90, at 82 (noting that the goal of the traditional criminal
tribunal is to seek redress for injustice); Sangster, supra note 84 (noting that traditional
prosecutorial forms of justice, as evidenced by the Nuremberg trials, require "that the pun-
ishment of human rights crimes must be through traditional legal processes"); Thurow,
supra note 1, (quoting a woman who was informed of the circumstances of her husband's
death during testimony before the TRC as stating, "[y]ou are raised with a sense of justice
that if someone does such gruesome acts, the person faces the law").
139. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., AGENCY OBJECI'IVEs: RULE OF LAW, at http://
www.usaid.gov/democracy/rol.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2003).
140. See Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1998,
available at 1998 WL 12052522 .
141. See Jaime Malamud Goti, Book Note, Silencing the Guns in Haiti: The Promise
of Deliberative Democracy, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 604, 605 (1998) (praising the author Irwin
Stotzky for "outlin[ing] a political, social and economic order in which disagreements over
the direction of that order can be socially addressed through a process of free, equal, and
collective deliberation").
142. U.S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., supra note 139; Press Release, Madeline Albright,
Secretary of State, Statement on the Rule of Law (Sept. 19, 2000), at http://secretary.state.
gov/www/statements/2000/000919.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2002).
143. See Sangster, supra note 84.
144. Douglass Cassel, Book Note, Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in New
Democracies, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 601, 602 (1998).
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V. NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION IN RETROSPECT
A. The TRC Misses Its Mark
It has been argued that unless there is something that compels an indi-
vidual to confess, he will not do so voluntarily, for such an action goes
against human nature.145 The TRC continues to be lauded for its efforts
in attempting to reconcile all South Africans with the painful effects of
apartheid.146 Yet, the concepts of forgiveness and reconciliation are not
universal, 47 and for many South Africans, the TRC fell short of reaching
its stated goals of national unity and reconciliation.148 South Africa, as a
sovereign nation, created the TRC as the main mechanism through which
the horrors of apartheid would be addressed. The political creators of the
TRC, pursued a course of social restorative justice for many reasons. Yet,
the strength of these reasons seem inadequate after thoughtful
examination.
One rationale that has been put forth for utilizing the truth commission
model instead of pursuing criminal prosecutions is that the latter would
have been too costly.149 Yet, this reason is wholly unsatisfactory, consid-
ering the atrocities associated with apartheid. Both supporters and oppo-
nents of apartheid, as well as innocent victims were tortured, burned,
maimed, and killed.I5 And while human life is deemed to be priceless,
murderers were permitted to go free under the premise that prosecuting
them would be too expensive . 51  Arguing that price will be determinative
of whether an offender is prosecuted for his crime is antithetical to a
strong legal system based upon the rule of law.1 52
145. Truth Essential to Reconciliation, KOREA TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, available at 2001
WL 3285879.
146. Michael Battle, The Theology of Community: The Ubuntu Theology of Desmond
Tutu, INTERPRETATION, April 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 12220737 (praising Archbishop
Tutu for raising the voices of apartheid victims and revealing the names of torturers so that
history may be corrected and dignity restored).
147. Clive McFarlane, Conference Offers Philosophies on Forgiving Terrorists, TELE-
GRAM & GAZETrE, Sept. 17, 2001, at A8.
148. See South Africa Looks Back, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Econ File (observing that many South Africans, including the family of slain
Black Conscious leader Steven Biko, feel that amnesty does not promote reconciliation);
Thurow, supra note 1.
149. McGregor, supra note 67, at 36; McCarthy, supra note 68, at 189.
150. See Guela, supra note 89.
151. See generally Stephen Landsman, Those Who Remember the Past May Not be
Condemned to Repeat it, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1564, 1590 (2000) (discussing alternatives to
criminal trials).
152. McGregor, supra note 67, at 36 (citing to cost considerations will surely thwart
the adjudicative system).
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Another reason that has been articulated for choosing a truthful disclo-
sure policy is that achieving successful criminal prosecutions and convic-
tions in a transitional democracy like South Africa would have been too
difficult, and could have potentially torn the country further apart.153
The combination of South Africa's political instability and the threat of
renewed violence led to the absence of legal tribunals charged with the
authority to prosecute criminal apartheid offenders.154 Yet, in light of
previous successful prosecution of similar human rights violators, the ease
with which this rationale was accepted is intolerable.' 55
In addition, both sides of the political spectrum reasoned that all of the
apartheid victims would benefit more from forgiveness than retribu-
tion. 156 However, this rationale assumes that the victims of apartheid
would be ready or willing to forgive the wrongdoers; that the revelation
of the truth would bring about reconciliation; and that the offer of am-
nesty would compel individuals to disclose the truth, in turn fostering and
furthering the TRC's objectives.157 Claiming that forgiveness would be
the better choice arrogantly presumes that the victim would have picked
truth and forgiveness instead of criminal prosecution and punishment.'58
Essentially, Mandela's Government of National Unity, in a political com-
promise with the defeated apartheid regime, precluded the victims from
exercising their right to seek redress in a court of law.' 59 The reasons for
153. See Susanna Braun, Forgiveness, South Africa's Truth Commission, and Military
Trials: America's Options in Dealing with Crimes Against Humanity in Light of the Terror-
ist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 493, 509-10 (2002)
(arguing that "methods for dealing with the crimes committed against humanity during the
existence of apartheid needed to assign accountability, while at the same time avoiding
methods that would continue to divide the nation making it difficult for its citizens to move
beyond the past" and noting that Nuremburg type tribunals could have led to a coup).
154. See Stewart, supra note 104, at 118. The political instability within South Africa
after the fall of apartheid, plus a mere threat by the defeated, pro-apartheid Nationalist
Party that criminal prosecutions would lead to renewed violence, provided the needed jus-
tification for the absence of adequate legal tribunals with the specific duty of prosecuting
apartheid offenders.
155. See Sangster, supra note 84 (considering the Nuremberg trials in their historical
context).
156. See Julie Lansing & Julie C. King, South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission: The Conflict Between Individual Justice and National Healing in the Post
Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 753, 761 (1998) (noting that the goals of the
TRC were the result of a compromise between the anti-apartheid ANC and pro-apartheid
NP).
157. See Truth Essential to Reconciliation, supra note 145.
158. David A. Hill, National Sovereignity: Must it be Sacrificed to the International
Criminal Court? 14 BYU J. PUB. L. 119, 148 (1999).
159. Lansing & King, supra note 156, at 759, 761; Karen Gallagher, No Justice No
Peace: The Legalities and Realities of Amnesty in Sierra Leone, 23 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
149, 169 (2000).
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such action are not only flawed, but insufficiently justify the trading away
of citizens' legal rights.
The South African government and the TRC presupposed that many of
the apartheid perpetrators would come forward and disclose the truth. 6 °
Yet, many of these perpetrators had no desire to confess their crimes be-
cause they believed they had not committed any crimes. 61 Furthermore,
the offenders were at little risk of being prosecuted in a court of law since
the TRC lacked prosecutorial authority, and the judiciary's role of prose-
cuting criminals had been constitutionally trumped by the TRC. 6 2 The
perpetrators of the violent atrocities had the best of both worlds - either
refuse to willingly come forward and confess the truth thereby suffering
negligible consequences; or come forward, provide a full and truthful dis-
closure and escape ultimate criminal and civil liability. 163 While the TRC
was designed to foster reconciliation, in a country as delicate as the new
South Africa, truthful confessions based upon voluntary disclosure could
not equalize the overarching economic, social, and political disparities
needed for reconciliation to take root and grow.1 64
B. Things Could Have Been Different
It is important to note that nothing in the language of the interim Con-
stitution required that such a shield against criminal or civil liability be
attached to the grant of amnesty. 165 In drafting the Promotion of Na-
tional Unity and Reconciliation Act, Parliament chose to interpret their
constitutional mandate liberally and thus enacted provisions to afford
160. See Lansing & King, supra note 156, at 780 (stating that the Truth Commission
believed that it could induce more people to tell truth about their crimes by offering possi-
ble amnesty); Llewellyn, supra note 129, at 361 (stating that perpetrators must apply for
amnesty).
161. See Stephen Laufer, Truth and Apartheid, NATION 5 (1998), available at LEXIS,
News Library, Nation file (providing an example of resisting the TRC by refusing to ap-
pear before it against warnings from Nelson Mandela); see also Battle, supra note 148
(regretting that there are still both victims and perpetrators who are not coming forward).
162. See Schey et al., supra note 83, at 327 (noting that the TRC had no authority to
prosecute); Battle, supra note 146 (stating that "those who established the TRC chose
truth above prosecution").
163. See Llewellyn, supra note 129, at 382; Only the Truth, supra note 7 (stating that
amnesty would be granted for those who told the truth about their crimes); Truth Essential
to Reconciliation, supra note 145.
164. See Rasheed Aareen, What is Post-Apartheid South Africa and Its Place in the
World?, at http://sunsite.wits.ac.za/biennale/essays/aareen.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2002).
165. See Epilogue of Constitution Act 200 of 1993 (noting that to advance reconcilia-
tion "amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions, and offenses associated with
political objectives"); McCarthy, supra note 68, at 198 (citing that victims of apartheid
challenged the civil and criminal provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act as viola-
tions of the interim constitution).
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criminal and civil indemnity as part of the amnesty package. 66 Subse-
quently, these provisions were challenged by victims of apartheid, claim-
ing the Truth Commission Act violated the Constitution.167
In the AZAPO 168 case, the petitioners asserted that the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Act violated sections 22 and 35(1) of the interim Constitution,
which provides that every person shall have the right "to have justiciable
disputes settled by a court of law, or other independent or other indepen-
dent and impartial forum, 169 and that "all South African courts [must]
consult applicable international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights,"
including section 22.17° It was the petitioner's contention that the "am-
nesty committee created by the Act was neither a court of law nor an
independent or impartial forum," and was in any event not authorized to
settle "justiciable disputes."'' The Constitutional Court however, felt
otherwise, and concluded that the amnesty provisions did not violate the
Constitution, and thus paved the way for the most heinous of criminals to
go free. 172
VI. TRUTH VS. JUSTICE: PROPOSALS FOR PROMOTING
THE RULE OF LAW
A. Justice Better Serves the Rule of Law
The South African government desired national reconciliation, and a
smooth transition to democracy.' 73 In effectuating these goals, criminal
prosecutions were exchanged for social restorative justice typified by the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 174 Under the traditional notions
of justice, however, the laws are enforced by the judiciary and the
criminals are punished for their crimes committed in violation of either
166. See McCarthy, supra note 68, at 198-201 (discussing a 1996 case, [Azanian Peo-
ples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of Republic of South Africa, 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC)], in
which the court found the inclusion of criminal and civil indemnities as part of the amnesty
package acceptable on the basis of "the diversity of approaches" other nations have used
to reconcile their past).
167. Azanian Peoples Org. (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of South Africa,
1996 (4) SA 671 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20, at *1; McCarthy, supra note 68, at 198-99.
168. 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC), 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20.
169. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20, at *1.
170. McCarthy, supra note 68, at 199.
171. Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20, at *6; McCarthy, supra note 68,
at 199.
172. See Azanian Peoples Org., 1996 SACLR LEXIS 20, at *77-8; McCarthy, supra
note 68, at 200.
173. See generally Pmbl. of Constitution Act 200 of 1993, at http://www.gov.za/constitu
tion/1993/1993cons.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
174. See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 96, at 214.
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domestic or international law." 5 A stable and efficient legal system must
be based upon the rule of law, and that foundation must encompass crim-
inal and civil proceedings in an open court of law.17 6 The rule of law is
critical to a country's economic, social, and political existence and sur-
vival; and it is best served when apartheid-like crimes are prosecuted in
an impartial court of law that gives discretion to the trier of fact during
the guilt and punishment phases of the trial. 77 The rule of law is for the
benefit and protection of all people throughout the world; and by exercis-
ing the rule of law through strong legal mechanisms, criminals will be
punished and victims will have a more satisfying sense of the truth.178
B. Reaching Reconciliation in South Africa
Admittedly, truth and justice are two of the most powerful motives
leading to reconciliation, and without justice, reconciliation may never
become a reality.' 79 South Africa first focused on disclosure of the truth
as a way of attaining national reconciliation, and in essence relegated
criminal prosecutions and proportional punishments to a subordinate po-
sition. 8 Despite the cathartic results truth commissions seemingly pro-
vide, the "truth phase" is frequently the only phase, rendering truth
commissions considerably deficient since their inception.' The TRC
175. See id. at 215 (noting that conventional forms of criminal justice are often used to
punish); Schey et al., supra note 83, at 330 (stating that the modern trend in international
law is to prosecute and punish violations of human rights).
176. See generally Carothers, supra note 140, at 95 (discussing the rule of law and its
correlation to a stable government); Sangster, supra note 84 (observing that the "punish-
ment of human rights crimes should be punished by traditional legal processes in order to
uphold the rule of law and to ensure that the law is given the proper respect accorded to
it").
177. See Carothers, supra, note 140, at 95, 96 (defining the rule of law as "a system in
which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to every-
one"); see also, Llewellyn, supra note 129, at 369-71 (noting the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission does not provide "retributive justice" because it "robs victims of their right to
seek their own justice through either the criminal or civil courts").
178. See Only the Truth, supra note 7 (expressing a desire for people who committed
crimes during apartheid to be punished); see also Jerelyn Eddings, The Shield of Truth, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 10, 1997, at 13 (stating that one side in the amnesty compro-
mise favored unrelenting punishment for political criminals); Paul Lansing & Julie C. King,
South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: The Conflict Between Individual Jus-
tice and National Healing in the Post-Apartheid Age, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 753,
771; Okechukwu Oko, Confronting Transgressions of Prior Military Regimes Towards a
More Pragmatic Approach, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 89, 112-13 (2003) (arguing
that the prosecution of perpetrators will reinforce a "commitment to the rule of law").
179. Long, Winding Road to Reconciliation, JAKARTA POST, April 17, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 4787979.
180. See Schey, supra note 83, 326-27 (1997).
181. See Sangster, supra note 84.
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maintains that truth, as a restorative mechanism, will be the only way to
bring about the reconciliation and reconstruction that the interim Consti-
tution and President Mandela's Government of National Unity envi-
sioned.182 Yet, the people of South Africa continue to insist that only
through trials and punishment of the wrongdoers can the country truly
reach reconciliation. 83
The TRC has concluded its constitutional mandate and its efforts have
not produced the desired and articulated goals.' 84 Since the truth of
apartheid has been revealed and well-documented, it is now incumbent
upon the government to provide the people of South Africa with justice,
irrespective of the allegations that initiating criminal prosecutions of
apartheid criminals would be too difficult, too costly, too impractical, or
too inadequate to do justice in the fragile democracy. South Africans
must demand that a strong legal system underscored by the rule of law be
immediately implemented and then constantly and carefully maintained;
that the South African government review and reform its policies regard-
ing the criminal and civil indemnity applicant's received upon a grant of
amnesty from the TRC; and that the South African government actively
pursue and prosecute those apartheid offenders who refused to engage in
the TRC's truth-telling process. If national reconciliation and unity is to
be achieved, these steps are imperative.
Admittedly, the South African government may be incapable of imple-
menting legal tribunals with the full authority to administer efficient and
swift justice by way of prosecuting and punishing apartheid criminals.
And if that is the case, then the GNU must appeal to the United Nations
and request that the Security Council, together with the International
Court of Justice create a separate tribunal specifically designed to investi-
gate, prosecute, and render proportional punishments to the offenders of
crimes committed during apartheid.
Although this proposed course of action may be quickly dismissed as
too difficult, the TRC's involvement could lend considerable support to
this unique undertaking and minimize the complexities facing the Inter-
national Court of Justice. For example, most of the amnesty applicants
were intermediaries, and their testimony alone did not provide the TRC
with sufficient evidence to link apartheid murders, tortures, and other
horrendous crimes to top-ranking, decision-making officials. Moreover,
182. See Villa-Vicencio, supra note 96, at 214 (indicating that South Africa's TRC
used restorative justice to establish a more complete and better understanding of justice).
183. See Only the Truth, supra note 7 (expressing a desire for people who committed
crimes during apartheid to be punished).
184. See Tinyiko Sam Maluleke, Can Lions and Rabbits Reconcile? The South African
TRC as an Instrument for Peace-Building, ECUMENIAL REV., Apr. 1, 2001, at 190, available
at 2001 WL 16615054.
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due to its constitutional mandate, the TRC was unable to use its sub-
poena power and compel apartheid leaders to come forward. 185 How-
ever, the evidence collected during the TRC's investigations and hearings
could be utilized by the International Court of Justice to initiate prosecu-
tions and obtain convictions in accordance with international law. 186 The
collaborative efforts between the TRC and the International Court of
Justice would further legitimize the TRC'S purported desires of achieving
national unity and reconciliation by ensuring that the criminals of
apartheid are prosecuted and punished. Only with this necessary course
of action will the victims of apartheid finally be provided with a modicum
of justice. If the rule of law is to be restored in South Africa, and in turn
fostered throughout the world, now is the time for change.
C. Considerations for the International Community
The United Nations, of which South Africa was and still is a member,
proclaims under Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter that "promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" ' 7 is one of
the purposes of the United Nations.1 88 In other words, every signatory
Member of the U.N. Charter pledged to promote and protect human
rights.' 89 Yet, at the height of the apartheid regime, the United Nations
chose to ignore the gravity of the situation in South Africa, and allowed
the Member States to turn a blind eye to atrocities that have been likened
to crimes against humanity. 190
185. See South Africa, Search for Truth, ECONOMIST, Sept. 28, 1996, at 50, LEXIS,
News Library, Econ File (noting that apartheid leaders are reluctant to appear before the
truth commission because amnesty was not guaranteed, but that those that did apply are
already in prison for their apartheid crimes and that they may use the truth commission for
amnesty).
186. Sangster, supra note 84 (noting that under the Principles on the Effective Preven-
tion and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (the Principles)
and the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (the
Declaration), which are legal instruments Amnesty International uses to determine am-
nesty questions, those who commit international crimes are not immune from
prosecution).
187. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3; THOMAS BUERGENTAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL § 2-3, at 23 (2d ed. 1995).
188. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3; BUERGENTAL, supra note 187, § 2-3, at 25.
189. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56. Article 56 states "[a]ll members pledge them-
selves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Article 55 reads in part "the United
Nations shall promote... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights .. "
190. See LEMON ET AL., supra note 23. The UN "regretted" the refusal of South Af-
rica to end apartheid in the early years and it was not until the Sharpeville Massacre of
1960 that the UN successfully voted to sanction South Africa.
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Under the U.N. Charter and the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,
the lawful use of force to stop a state's mistreatment of its citizens has
been allowed when this mistreatment is "so brutal and large-scale as to
shock the conscience of the community of nations."' 91 The brutality of
apartheid shocked the conscience of the international community, as evi-
denced by various economic sanctions and the eventual expulsion of
South Africa from the United Nations General Assembly. 92 However,
the oppression continued for decades without any direct intervention by
the United Nations' Security Council or the International Court of Jus-
tice.1 93 The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is gaining international
acceptance1 94 and has come to mean that a nation state can no longer
claim that the maltreatment of its citizenry is a matter within its exclusive
jurisdiction. 95 Thus, under the auspices of the United Nations Charter,
in conjunction with the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights, and other various human rights instru-
ments, the legal framework for putting an end to apartheid was available
to the international community.' 96 Yet, none of the human rights instru-
ments in place at the time were utilized to stop the apartheid brutalities.
Simply because the powers under the human rights instruments were not
exercised during apartheid does not mean that the United Nations Char-
ter, the International Bill of Human Rights, and the concept of humanita-
rian intervention have no place in the reconciliation process in South
Africa today. The language of the United Nations Charter does not place
time limitations upon when crimes that violate international law will be
barred from prosecution.' 97 Therefore, it is not too late for the interna-
tional community to address apartheid in a legal forum that is authorized
to prosecute, apportion criminal responsibility, and issue proportional
punishments in accordance with the rule of law.
191. BUERGENTAL, supra 187, § 1-3, at 3.
192. See FETER, supra note 7, at 620; LEMON ET AL-, supra note 23.
193. See LEMON ET AL, supra note 23 (indicating that South Africa was not removed
from the General Assembly until 1974 and apartheid was not considered a crime against
humanity by the UN until the 1980s).
194. See BUERGENTAL, supra note 187, § 1-3, at 4-5 (stating that the recent decisions
of the United Nations suggest it is moving towards adopting a "modern version of the
doctrine of collective humanitarian intervention").
195. BUERGENrAL, supra note 187, § 2-3, at 26 (noting that "although the validity of
this proposition has been frequently challenged. . .today the issue is no longer open to
doubt").
196. See BUERGENTAL, supra note 187, § 2-3, at 27 (asserting that the various human
rights instruments clarify the obligations imposed by Art. 55 and 56 of the U.N. Charter).
197. See generally U.N. CHARTER, Ch. -IX (showing no specific provision which indi-
cates a time limitation).
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In addition, the United Nations Charter could be expanded by amend-
ment allowing individual citizens (as opposed to Member States) to file
complaints with the International Court of Justice. Individuals are
"deemed to have internationally guaranteed rights as individuals," rather
than as "nationals of a particular state."' 98 This proposal would allow the
victims of apartheid to initiate criminal prosecutions and attain justice,
rather than being forced to choke down the injustice of a perpetrator's
truthful disclosure in front of the TRC that could result in an unqualified
grant of freedom from punishment.
There is wide-ranging agreement that customary international law does
not favor amnesty, and in some instances prohibits it for crimes against
humanity.1 99 Customary international law imposes a general and consis-
tent practice, based upon principles of opinio juris, °° that is followed by
nation states out of a sense of legal obligation.2' Customary interna-
tional law not only allows permissive jurisdiction over perpetrators of
crimes against humanity, but also permits their prosecution and prohibits
the granting of amnesty to such wrongdoers.2 °2 But because the jurisdic-
tion that is granted is only permissive, rather than mandatory, Member
States may not be bound to it and this illuminates another obstacle in the
way of bringing apartheid offenders into a court of law empowered to
assess their criminal responsibility. By allowing the South African gov-
ernment to use countervailing considerations like national reconciliation,
and thus overlook its obligation to customary international law and fail to
prosecute the criminals of apartheid, 0 3 the international community sent
out alarming and significant signals to other nation states searching for a
way to reconcile their countries that have been similarly ravaged by op-
pressive regimes and systemic human rights abuses.2 °4
When world leaders speak of bringing criminals to justice, they mean
retributive justice exercised by a court of law in which sentences of pun-
198. BUERGENTAL, supra note 187, § 1-8, at 19.
199. See Schey, supra note 83, at 330. BLACK'S LAW DICT"IONARY 378 (7th ed. 1999)
(defining crime against humanity as "a brutal crime that is not an isolated incident but that
involves large and systematic actions, often cloaked with official authority, and that shocks
the conscience of humankind," i.e. "mass murder, extermination, enslavement").
200. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 1119 (defining the principle of
opinio juris as "[tihe principle that for a country's conduct to rise to the level of interna-
tional customary law, it must be shown that the conduct stems from the country's belief
that international law rather than the moral obligation mandates the conduct").
201. See Scharf, supra note 53, at 175.
202. See id. at 174-75.
203. Id.
204. See Ed O'Loughlin, Guilty Can Evade Truth Commission, AUSTRALASIAN Bus.
INTELLIGENCE: THE AGE, Feb. 2, 2000, at 7, available at 2000 WL 11128344.
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ishment are handed down.2°5 Moreover, "there is a moral cost when jus-
tice is subordinated to truth, history, or reconciliation., 20 6 And the
negotiated settlement made by Mandela's government, which material-
ized in the TRC, secured a vehicle for criminals to go unpunished, and for
crimes against humanity to go un-adjudicated. As mass human rights
abuses come to light, future violence will only be avoided by rejecting
blanket amnesty or impunity, establishing and maintaining the rule of law
through strong legal systems, and determining accountability for crimes
against humanity through judicial mechanisms.2 °7 If gross human rights
violations are to be eradicated, the international community must recog-
nize, adhere to, and vigorously reinforce treaty obligations premised
upon the rule of law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite the TRC's efforts at achieving peace and reconciliation during
South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy, 2 8 the disclosure
of the truth denied justice from being done, demonstrating that truth and
justice may be incompatible after all, and that truth alone can never be
adequate.20 9 International human rights norms can and have had an in-
fluential effect on the behavior of nation states, 2 0 and the protection of
human rights has become one of the most significant issues facing the
world community today. The laws necessary to deal with gross violations
of human rights are already in place, but until those laws are constantly
and unconditionally adhered to, and until the institutions charged with
enforcing those laws are substantially strengthened, the protection they
offer now and in the future will continue to be minimal.21'
Reconciliation and national unity was what the country of South Africa
wanted and needed. Yet, exchanging truth for justice and avoiding adher-
ence to international law harmed and continues to harm the true victims
of apartheid because their basic constitutional right to have "justiciable
disputes settled by a court of law" was precluded. 2 2 Furthermore, the
rule of law was dealt a serious blow when the international community
205. See Llewellyn, supra note 129, at 369.
206. Abrams, supra note 116.
207. Neil J. Kritz, Book Note, War Crimes: Brutality, Genocide, Terror, and the Strug-
gle for Justice, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 983, 985 (1999).
208. Truth Essential to Reconciliation, supra note 145.
209. See Kritz, supra note 207, at 986.
210. See Stewart, supra note 104, at 115.
211. See BUERGENTAL, supra note 187, § 1-8, at 20.
212. Judith Hippler Bello & Daniel F. Wilhelm, South Africa - Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, Amnesty, Truth Commissions, Constitutional Inter-
pretation, Human Rights, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 360, 361-62 (1997).
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allowed apartheid and all its atrocities to transpire in South Africa. 213
And when the chance to revive and reinforce the rule of law came about,
South Africa's Government of National Unity further destabilized it by
allowing criminals to escape all liability.214 The rule of law is the founda-
tion upon which every civilized society rests, and it is this foundation that
keeps the fabric of all societies tightly woven and allows them to prosper
and endure.215 It must not be further diluted, disregarded, or traded
away under any circumstance - not again, not ever.
213. See Woods, supra note 132, at 86-88.
214. See Llewellyn, supra note 129, at 369-71 (noting the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission does not provide "retributive justice" because it "robs victims of their right to
seek their own justice through either the criminal or civil courts.").
215. Carothers, supra note 140, at 95, 96.
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